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INTRODUCTION 
Stanley Fish draws the Introduction of Winning Arguments to an emphatic close.  He tells us 
that ‘argument is everywhere, argument is unavoidable, argument is interminable’.1  He also 
declares that ‘argument is all we have’.2  He means by this that the arguments we advance 
successfully deliver the world to us ‘in a particular shape’.3  He also tells us that, if we are to 
argue successfully, we must do so in ways that are ‘context-specific’.4  These claims 
concerning argument will be familiar to anyone who has read Fish’s earlier writings on law 
and literature.  The idea that what we call ‘fact’ is theory-laden bulks large in these works.  To 
embrace this idea is to take the view that our concepts and the arguments in which they feature 
shape our understanding of the circumstances in which we find ourselves.5  Fish has also given 
currency to the idea that we owe the concepts and arguments that we use to make sense of our 
circumstances to interpretive communities.  On his account, interpretive communities are 
authoritative, intersubjective reference points in controversies that concern the objects to which 
their members devote attention.6 This is because the individuals (eg, lawyers) who make up 
such a community share a sense of relevance as to what is at stake in the fields that concern 
them.7  Consequently, they (rather than a text or the intentions of its author(s)) are the centre 
of interpretive gravity in the contexts effectively constituted by the understandings that unite 
them. 
While these points will be old hat to anyone familiar with Fish, Winning Arguments brings into 
sharp focus a set of assumptions at work in his mind that have great relevance to law.  Fish tells 
us that he is ‘making an argument about argument and its relationship to the human condition’.8  
He develops this point by identifying argument as ‘the medium we swim in, whether we want 
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to or not’.9  He also tells us that the purpose of argument is not to achieve a consensus that wins 
the support of all rational people.  Rather, it affords a means to prevail at the expense of others: 
eg, where the ‘adherents of different partisan frameworks’ of thought seek to triumph at their 
opponents’ expense.10  In this example, Fish drives home the message that aggression lies at 
the heart of argument.  He reinforces this message when he states that ‘words are aimed, they 
are sent out in volleys, … they are sprayed around like bullets’.11   
These are features of Winning Arguments and Fish’s writings more generally that call to mind 
the jurisprude Carl Schmitt.  For Schmitt described politics as a struggle between friends and 
foes – to which he added the point that the upshot could be a conflict that ultimately takes a 
violent and perhaps even exterminatory turn.12  Readers will search Winning Arguments in vain 
for chilling statements of this sort.  However, Fish pursues a theme that has affinities with 
Schmitt’s account of friend-versus-foe politics.  He tells us that argument may sweep away the 
politico-legal frameworks, or normative worlds, we make and inhabit and that invest our lives 
with a sense of significance and security.  On this view, we are always vulnerable to the 
depradations of those who could prevail at our expense by means of argument.  Thus there is 
no ‘oasis’ or ‘safe space’ that is entirely secure (whether it be a society-wide politico-legal 
framework or the spaces that people share in intimate or other relations with others).13  This 
essay will not seek to gainsay this view.  However, there are reasons for thinking that it may 
be possible to establish a normatively appealing, enduring, but not entirely safe politico-legal 
space.  We will (in the penultimate section of this essay) explore this possibility by reference 
to Britain’s legal order (and the liberal political philosophy that is, on the analysis below, at 
work within it).  As we will see, Fish (notwithstanding the fact that he has declared himself to 
be ‘against liberalism generally’) lends support to the claim that it may be possible to establish 
and maintain such a space.14  To demonstrate that this is the case, we will subject not just 
Winning Arguments but many of his other works to close analysis.  We will also explore their 
significance by drawing on the jurisprudential contributions of Herbert Hart and Ronald 
Dworkin and a recent analysis of human linguistic capacity offered by the philosopher Charles 
Taylor.  Our focus will be on argument and the interpretive communities in which Fish 
identifies it as unfolding.  There are reasons for thinking that Fish (notwithstanding the close 
attention he has devoted to interpretive communities in legal and other contexts) has 
underestimated their practical significance.  This is because these communities and the 
language in which their concerns find expression embody and make possible the accumulation 
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of social capital (cooperative modes of interaction that find expression in dispositions, 
practices, and institutions).   
STANLEY FISH ON ARGUMENT 
Clearly, there is, on Fish’s analysis, no escape from argument (since it is everywhere).  But 
while he takes this view, he recognises that ‘[m]any people do not wish to believe this’ and 
seek to identify ‘something that will neutralise argument’.15  Fish finds in the aspiration he 
describes ‘the desire for another world’ and adds that it would take the form of ‘a safe oasis’.16  
Moreover, he argues that people could only enjoy the benefits of such an oasis by fastening on 
a body of ‘truth’ capable of bringing argument to an end.17  Fish dismisses this possibility in 
terms that make apparent his commitment to the theory-ladenness of fact.  He tells us that we 
have no prospect of apprehending ‘the unvarnished truth’.18  An ‘intermediary layer’ (our 
conceptual schemes) always interposes itself between us and ‘the real’ for which we go in 
search.19  Thus we must accept that the most argument can ‘achieve’ is persuasion rather than 
transcendence - in the form of movement into the realm of ‘the really real’ (to use Richard 
Rorty’s phrase).20  Persuasion can, on Fish’s account, bring into existence a ‘bounded argument 
space’: eg., a legal system within which a limited range of arguments will have authoritative 
force.21  Fish tells us that the existence of these spaces demonstrates that we can use language 
to build a particular ‘this’ (eg., the British constitution) rather than a ‘that’.22  However, 
language gives us the power to unsettle existing certainties: eg., by opening up a ’space of 
doubt’ that we then fill with ‘alternative readings’ of our circumstances.23  Thus we should 
recognise that, while the sources of authority we possess may talk to us in ‘the accents of 
infallibility’, they are contingencies (rhetorical achievements) vulnerable to the assaults of 
argument.24  He adds that these assaults can result in ‘change’ and ‘reversal’ within a bounded 
argument space or the ‘transformation’ of such a context.25    
Fish illustrates his position on argument-as-rhetoric by reference to numerous examples, legal 
and non-legal.  The US Supreme Court’s response to same-sex marriage provides him with an 
example of change in the law.  He notes that ‘deeply entrenched’ hostility to same-sex unions 
(that made appeal to ‘nature or natural morality’) came under strain in Lawrence v Texas.26  By 
a 6-3 majority, the Court in Lawrence identified a prohibition on sodomy in the state of Texas 
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as unconstitutional.  For the majority, Kennedy J stated that the Court could not justify its 
decision by reference to ‘deep convictions’ that (in the minds of their proponents) have the 
status of ‘ethical and moral principles’.27  Rather, it staked out a position according to which 
‘liberty gives substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private 
lives in matters pertaining to sex’.28  Fish adds that the Supreme Court applied this statement 
of general principle to same-sex marriage in Obergefell v Hodges (when it identified such 
unions as lawful).29  The process of change that culminated in Obergefell also illustrates a point 
Fish makes about legal precedents.  He identifies those who draw a sharp distinction between 
binding and persuasive legal authorities as naïve.  On his account, precedents are always 
vulnerable to processes of argument that may undercut their authority.  For this reason, we 
should think of them as ‘binding if persuasive’.30  On this view, precedents are persuasive if 
they sustain practical arrangements (eg, a tolerant model of human association) that judges (the 
relevant interpretive community) consider appealing.  Thus Obergefell and Lawrence present 
us with a struggle that has to do with the pursuit (by rhetorical means) of political ends (human 
association in particular forms) within a bounded argument space (the US constitution).  
Fish contrasts this politico-legal view of law with the ‘liberal’ account he finds in Reginald 
Rose’s teleplay and film, Twelve Angry Men.31  Rose presents law as a set of procedures that 
make it possible to respond justly to matters of plain (as opposed to theory-laden) fact.  This 
view of law finds expression in ‘the story of a jury’ (in a criminal trial) whose members must 
‘get at the truth about a matter of life and death’.32  Their task is to determine whether a young 
man is guilty of murdering his father with a knife.  One witness has told them that the boy 
shouted ‘I’ll kill you’ at his father.33  They are also aware that the young man ‘had done a stint 
in reform school’ (after the police had found him in possession of a knife).34  Eleven of the 
twelve jurors are ready to convict.  However, Juror #8 dissents from their view and this prompts 
his colleagues to call him an ‘outlier’.35  This critical response leaves Juror #8 undaunted.  He 
advances arguments (eg, the person who inflicted the fatal wound must have been taller than 
the defendant) that lead the other jurors to rethink their position.  However, Fish does not find 
in Juror #8’s success evidence of a ‘triumph of careful, reasoned argument … over premature 
judgment’.36  Rather, it is a rhetorical triumph.  This is because Rose ‘takes care to put all the 
things the audience wants to hear - … be measured, be respectful of legal process – in Juror 
#8’s mouth’.37  Moreover, Rose describes Juror #8 as ‘“a man who sees all sides of every 
question and constantly seeks the truth”’.38  These point lead Fish to conclude that Twelve 
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Angry Men is ‘a liberal setup’.39  For Rose presents it as ‘a lesson in how to avoid being 
manipulated by surfaces, verbal and otherwise’, while engaging in ‘a tour de force of 
manipulation’.40    
Fish finds in this example support for the conclusion that ‘[t]ruth independent of argument is 
not something we can have’.41  This means that those who hope to stop argument in its tracks 
by fastening on ‘the truth’ are pursuing a chimera.  On Fish’s account, people who take this 
view assume that truth will emerge if ‘you … institute a procedure’ that excludes ‘extraneous 
considerations’ and wins universal respect.42  The philosopher, Jürgen Habermas, provides Fish 
with an example of a thinker who takes this view.  Habermas is a proponent of ‘undistorted 
communication’.43  Fish describes this as communication that excludes all motives save the 
cooperative search for truth.  He adds that those who act on this motive seek to demonstrate 
mutual understanding by ascribing the same meaning to the same utterances.  These points lead 
Fish to conclude that the goal of ‘undistorted communication’ is ‘universal’ (and, we might 
add, enduring) harmony.44  On this view, Habermas holds out the hope of entry into the ‘oasis’ 
or ‘safe space’ that Fish believes to be unavailable to us.  Fish responds to Habermas by arguing 
that it is impossible for us to ‘occupy some independent, non-angled perspective – a 
contradiction in terms’ – from which we can make uncontroversial judgments on how things 
stand in the world.45  Consequently, we are not able to distinguish between ‘good and bad 
arguments’ – arguments that have the purpose of establishing a consensual understanding as 
against arguments that give us means of vanquishing our opponents.46  This means that we 
must accept that we live (and ‘always’ will live) in the ‘realm of instrumental purposes’.47  On 
this view, ‘interest’ always saturates the fields we contemplate.48  Fish argues that Habermas 
fails to grasp this because he assumes that all people can and should act in accordance with a 
philosophical ideal that requires them to transcend interest.  However, ‘saying that we are all 
philosophers’ does not, according to Fish, ‘make it so’.49  Hence, he finds in Habermas’s 
account of ‘undistorted communication’ an ‘instance of the general failure of ‘liberal 
rationalism’.50 
By ‘liberal rationalism’, Fish means the view that we can stand ‘above the partisan fray’ by 
using what Thomas Kuhn has called ‘a “neutral observation language”’ to capture plain truth.51  
Fish sets against this view his own understanding of language and, more particularly, argument 
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as ‘action’ that serves to advance an ‘agenda’ that is saturated in interest.52  Aggression runs 
like a connecting thread through the examples he uses to illustrate the sort of action he has in 
mind.  He says of the ‘adversary system’ of the common law that it creates a context in which 
‘verbal gladiators’ do battle.53  Moreover, he makes it clear that this and other such examples 
provide support for a more general point.  There has, he declares, ‘always been an intimate 
relationship between talking and warfare’.54  He also identifies ‘tension’, ‘self-assertion’ and 
‘conflict’ as ‘characteristics of argument’ and the human condition.55  He adds that argument 
is a process that ‘exasperation’ always attends.56  This is because ‘the career of argument is 
always running ahead of the intentions and desires of those who engage in it’ – with the result 
that it is a process we ‘cannot manage’.57  These claims are anything but surprising when we 
view them in the light of Fish’s belief that argument is a response to the fact that ‘nothing stays 
fixed; everything is ultimately up for grabs’.58  This analysis presents a picture of people who 
struggle incessantly to establish, by means of argument, the basic terms of social life in contexts 
that are (and always will be) unstable.59  Moreover, the instability with which they contend is 
due, in significant part, to argument.    
Winning Arguments brings these aspects of Fish’s thinking on argument into clear view.  But, 
in many ways, the points he makes echo those in his earlier writings.  In an essay entitled 
‘Force’, he seeks to debunk the assumption (which he associates with liberalism) that law 
affords a shelter from the (agenda- and will-driven) storm of politics.60  He uses H.L.A. Hart’s 
distinction between the ‘core’ and the ‘penumbra’ of concepts (legal and non-legal) to illustrate 
the point that law is not the oasis or safe space that liberals take it to be.  Hart famously argued 
that concepts have a core of certainty and an ineliminable penumbra of doubt.61 On Hart’s 
account, the core brings order and predictability to law’s operations by establishing a 
determinate and impersonal source from which it issues.62  By contrast, the penumbra leaves 
legal concepts with an ‘open texture’ that makes them conveniently malleable but, at the same 
time, a source of uncertainty and controversy on their proper extension.63  Fish argues that the 
core of certainty to which Hart refers is not a property of language.  Rather, it is a function of 
agreement in an interpretive community whose members invest the core with such significance 
as it possesses.64  Here, Fish traverses ground over which Hart had already moved.  This is 
apparent when Hart (drawing on Wittgenstein) observes that our ability to apply a particular 
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term to a ‘plain’ case reflects a prior ‘agreement in judgments’ on its significance.65  But while 
Hart deals with this point briskly, Fish uses it as the starting point for the pursuit of a familiar 
theme.  For he describes the agreements to which Hart refers as contingent, rhetorical 
achievements.  As such, they are vulnerable to the depredations of argument.  Thus the core, 
like the penumbra, is a site of struggle (albeit a struggle that may stand, for lengthy periods of 
time, in a state of gravid arrest).  This leads Fish to conclude that ‘law is always and already 
indistinguishable from the forces it would oppose’.66  He numbers among these forces 
particular agendas, convictions, programmes, and visions that people are ready to pursue 
‘aggressively’ in the face of opposition from others.67  Law emerges from this analysis (as it 
does from his account of the Obergefell and Lawrence decisions) as the site of political power 
struggles.68  
In a later essay, ‘The Law Wishes to Have a Formal Existence’, Fish dwells on interpretation 
and argument as processes relevant to the operations of a legal system.69  He tells us that law 
is supposed to be ‘perdurable’.70  With the aim of explaining what he means by ‘perdurable’, 
he draws on Hart’s account of the way in which legal rules lay down an ‘authoritative mark’.71  
According to Hart, all legal rules require an interpretive response (eg, do the facts in a dispute 
fall within or outside such-and-such a rule?).72  However, Fish uses the phrase ‘authoritative 
mark’ to make a significantly different point.73  He tells us that the purpose of such a mark is 
to bring the process of interpretation (the ascription of significance to an object under scrutiny) 
to an end.  Fish describes those who take this view as formalists.  For they assume that ‘one 
can write sentences of such precision and simplicity that their meanings leap off the page in a 
way no one … can ignore’.74  To this Fish responds by declaring that ‘anything, once a 
sufficiently elaborated argument is in place, can mean anything’.75  However, he adds that, 
while law is not a ‘strict’ constraint (an authoritative mark in his sense), it is nonetheless 
‘constraining’.76  By this he means that those who participate in law’s operations cannot ignore 
it.  However, they can seek to ‘get around’ it.77  To this end, they must tell stories that derive 
their ‘coherence’ and ‘plausibility’ from legal sources.78  By going about their business in this 
way, they have a realistic prospect of eliciting a positive response from the interpretive 
community to whom they address their words.  In this way, law places constraints on people’s 
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efforts to set aside ‘the meanings embedded in [a] … text’ in favour of those ‘demanded by 
some angled, partisan object’.79   
In light of these points (and those we considered earlier), the picture that emerges from Winning 
Arguments and Fish’s other writings is complex.  The self-applying ‘authoritative mark’ is a 
figment of the formalist imagination (at least as Fish describes it).  Interpretation, argument, 
and the exercise of rhetorical power are inescapable.  Consequently, law is a site of political 
struggle between people who seek to advance competing agendas.  However, this struggle 
proceeds in an institutional context that is ‘constraining’.  But while this is the case, those who 
participate in such a struggle may nonetheless pose a threat to the framework within which it 
unfolds.  This would be the case if they could ‘get around’ existing constraints in ways that 
made it possible to put in place a new set of foundations on which a new order could arise.  
These are points we can probe by reference to Carl Schmitt.  But before doing so, we must 
examine Schmitt’s thinking in some detail. 
CARL SCHMITT ON LAW AND POLITICS 
‘Hostility to liberal legal thinking’ is perhaps the most prominent feature of Schmitt’s 
jurisprudential writings.80  Signs of this hostility are apparent in an essay he produced while 
standing on the cusp of the decade (the 1920s) in which he would begin his rise to a position 
of jurisprudential prominence.  In Die Buribunken (a ‘historiographical essay’), he found in 
liberal legal contexts a misconceived ‘striving for security’.81  His aim in mounting this critique 
was to ‘open[ ] … the present towards a contingent future’.82  In the years that followed, 
Schmitt’s anti-liberal ire intensified and found expression in an assault on the rule of law.  He 
sought to demonstrate that efforts to meet the requirements of this ideal (by using publicly 
ascertainable norms to limit the state’s powers and secure the interests of individuals) are futile.  
To this end, he embraced the idea of radical indeterminacy (absence of meaning) and applied 
it to legal language.  On his account, radical indeterminacy was a pervasive problem in legal 
contexts.  Consequently, legal norms were (even in the most avowedly liberal legal systems) 
empty vessels.  This led him to mock liberal luminaries such as Montesquieu (who had 
identified judges as mouthpieces through which determinate bodies of law speak in clear terms 
to their addressees).83  In response to Montesquieu’s analysis (and others running on the same 
theme), Schmitt argued that law is ‘situational’.84  By ‘situational’, he meant a response to a 
particular set of circumstances that is not grounded on existing legal norms.  This led him to 
conclude that those who resolve legal disputes (most obviously judges) exercise pure power.85  
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Thus he gives us (at this still early point in his long career) an account of legal decision-making 
as ‘perfect “wilfulness”’ or, to use the term he favoured, ‘decisionism’.86  
Alongside, Schmitt’s account of indeterminacy in the law, we should set two other features of 
his thinking that have relevance to Fish.  The first is an understanding of politics that embraces 
a pessimistic political anthropology and a related commitment to what he called ‘political 
theology’.87  The second is an ‘institutional turn’ in his response to law’s deficiencies that took 
place in the 1930s.88  Just as Schmitt sought to undercut liberal assumptions concerning law’s 
determinacy, he mounted an assault on a conception of politics to which liberals have long 
been committed.  This conception identifies politics as a process of disinterested interest 
accommodation.  Schmitt finds in this view of politics ‘the undifferentiated optimism of a 
universal conception of man’.89  His response to it is dismissive.  For it fails to grasp that 
politics consists in a struggle between friends and enemies that, in its most intense forms, can 
turn into a life-and-death struggle.90  Here, Schmitt stakes out a position that reflects a distinct 
political anthropology according to which politics always threatens to turn violent because 
humans are by nature ‘bloodthirsty’.91  This leads him to argue that an adequate understanding 
of politics ‘cannot very well start with an anthropological optimism’.92  By this he means that 
politics has to take account of the fact that people are not ‘harmless’ but, rather, ‘dangerous’.93  
This is because they are ‘stirred by their drives’ (e.g., fear, greediness, and jealousy) and have 
‘an irresistible inclination to slide from passion to evil’.94  In order to counter these impulses, 
politics has to embrace not just the categories of friend and enemy but also those of good and 
evil.95  This point explains Schmitt’s mobilisation of the idea of ‘political theology’ (which 
places emphasis on the ‘need [for] redemption’).96  He identifies political theology as resting 
(as its name suggests) on faith.  Those who embrace any such faith assume it to be the pulsing 
centre of practical life and, in short order, identify themselves as good and their opponents as 
evil.  Thus they are uncompromising (and none too reflective) in their pursuit of their aims.  
They take the view that they must fight for the ‘truths’ (dictates of faith) to which they cleave 
– even if this necessitates a potentially exterminatory clash with others.97 
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In the 1930s, Schmitt continued to describe politics as a struggle between friends and foes.  
However, he moved away from ‘decisionism’ as he had elaborated it in the 1920s and made an 
institutional turn in the direction of what he called ‘concrete-order thinking’.98  In On the Three 
Types of Juristic Thought,  he identified law as a source of meaningful constraints where judges 
and others understand it as expressing the concerns of a group whose common life they share.99  
More particularly, he identified a shared cognitive background as shaping the thinking of those 
who make up such groups.100  Against such a background, it becomes possible to grasp the uses 
to which law (and other artefacts) can be put.  Notoriously, Schmitt’s ‘institutional turn’, along 
with his understanding of politics, gave him a basis on which to lend enthusiastic support to 
the Nazi movement.101  Unlike, Schmitt, Fish is not in the business of staking out a 
programmatic position.  However, there are aspects of Schmitt’s thinking that yield a basis on 
which to draw out some of the practical implications of what Fish has to say in Winning 
Arguments and elsewhere.  
FISH AND SCHMITT: POINTS OF INTERSECTION 
The most obvious point of intersection between Fish’s writings on law and those of Schmitt is 
commitment to the view that language is not a strong constraint on the exercise of judicial 
discretion.  In Schmitt’s early work this view finds expression in his relentless pursuit of the 
theme that the problem of indeterminacy afflicts legal language.  We can read Fish as endorsing 
this view when he declares that ‘anything, once a sufficiently elaborated argument is in place, 
can mean anything’.102  On this view, law does not provide us with determinate norms that 
repel ‘partisan’ interpretations.  However, in Fish’s writings on interpretation, the emphasis is 
not on words themselves.  Rather, it is on the interpretive communities whose members ascribe 
significance to them.  These groups are, on Fish’s analysis, the source of meaning.  This means 
that words become placeholders for ‘concerns’ their members have in common (and that reflect 
not definitional uniformity but what Wittgenstein called ‘agreement … in judgments’).103  For 
so long as such a group responds to these concerns in broadly similar ways, the meaning of a 
word (while open to a range of interpretations) is stable.  When the view of the group shifts in 
a new direction, a change in what the philosopher John Searle calls ‘collective intentionality’ 
takes place.104  The members of the group now share the intention of sustaining a new 
understanding (and the institutional landscape or social reality that it holds in place).  On this 
view ‘a word is the skin of a living thought’ – with the source of life being intersubjective 
(consensus in an interpretive community).105  This is a view that bears some similarities to the 
position Schmitt staked out when he made his ‘institutional turn’ in the 1930s.  For he argued 
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that law will be effective in circumstances where it reflects the views of those who see it as 
capturing their (intersubjective) understanding of what normality consists in.106 
Alongside the broadly similar view that Fish and Schmitt take on language, we must set 
accounts of humankind that have much in common.  Both ‘will’ and ‘aggression’ bulk large in 
Schmitt’s writings on this topic.  Schmitt makes it clear in his early work that will fills the void 
left by indeterminate legal language.  When he later places emphasis on the group as a 
steadying influence on the operations of the law, will (now in a collective form) continues to 
occupy a prominent place in his thinking.107  Moreover, this will is implacable.  In the face of 
resistance, it will respond with a vigour that tends in the direction of aggression.  Here, 
Schmitt’s thinking reflects the influence of thinkers (eg, Thomas Hobbes and Niccolò 
Machiavelli) who assume people to be aggressive.108  A broadly similar picture emerges when 
we consider Fish’s reflections on what he calls ‘the human condition’.109  On his account, 
people are assertive and restless in their efforts to advance their respective agendas.  On the 
topic of assertiveness, Winning Arguments provides support for a theme that Fish has 
developed in his earlier writings.  This is that, in practical spheres like law, ‘there is no final 
word’.110  Rather, there are ‘only the words provoked by those intended as final’.111  Fish 
presses this point further in Winning Arguments when he describes argument as ‘always 
running ahead of the intentions and desires of those who engage in it’.  Here, he presents us 
not merely with an account of argument as a practice that has no obvious stopping point but of 
those who engage in it as restless. 
Fish’s account of ‘the human condition’ puts wind in the sails of Schmitt’s critique of the 
‘anthropological optimism’ he finds in liberal political philosophy.  Thus it becomes possible 
to argue that Fish, like Schmitt, stakes out a position in the field of political anthropology.112  
To enter this field is to traverse tricky, contested territory (where the likelihood of making 
truth-claims that will win broad support is low).  While this is the case, we ignore political 
anthropology at our peril.  Thinkers who have the status of major reference points in 
contemporary jurisprudence have made contributions that are, at least, relevant to (if not 
consciously on) this topic.  This point applies, for example, to Herbert Hart’s account of ‘the 
minimum content of natural law’.  Here, Hart (drawing on Thomas Hobbes and David Hume) 
presents us with a list of considerations to which groups of people must be attentive if they 
seek to endure.113  Ronald Dworkin moves onto the terrain of political anthropology when he 
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dwells on the human capacity to foster communities in which people bestow equal concern and 
respect on one another.114  Moreover, he presents us with an optimistic political anthropology 
that contrasts with Hart’s more pessimistic (because Hobbes- and Hume-inflected) 
contribution.   
The fact that we find Hart and Dworkin (along with Fish and Schmitt) staking out distinct (and 
inevitably controversial) positions in this territory merits emphasis.  Their presence in this 
context points up the breadth of their respective contributions to jurisprudence.  These 
contributions are, to be sure, very much concerned with the delivery of insights that are analytic 
in orientation.  Thus we find Hart focusing on the prominent role played by rules in a legal 
system and Dworkin dwelling on principles and the light they throw on the character of such a 
system’s normativity.115  However, each of these contributions contains a more speculative 
component (of which analytic philosophy is chary) that falls within the field of political 
anthropology.116  In each case, this component has relevance to the liberal political philosophy 
at which Fish and Schmitt direct critical fire.  This is a point we will examine in detail in this 
essay’s penultimate section (where our focus will be on some of the large ambitions at work in 
the liberal tradition).  We will consider (in the light of the anthropological positions that Fish 
and Schmitt stake out) the extent to which it might be possible to realise these ambitions.  
However, before we turn to this topic, we will look more closely at Fish and Schmitt and set 
their respective contributions in the context of those offered by Hart and Dworkin.  By doing 
this, we will be able to pin down some important differences between Fish and Schmitt.  These 
differences have, as we will see, relevance to their respective responses to liberal political 
philosophy.  
HART, DWORKIN, AND SOME DIFFERENCES BETWEEN FISH AND SCHMITT 
As we noted in the last section, Fish and Schmitt share the assumption that people are prone to 
fall into conflict.  While this is the case, we should note a related point of divergence between 
them.  Schmitt relishes conflict. On his account, conflict (in the form of friend-versus-foe 
politics) makes it possible for groups to vanquish their enemies in battles that see them driven 
permanently from the field.  Fish sounds a similar note when he talks of a ‘final conflict’ in 
which one agenda supplants another.117  Such struggles arise when the proponents of 
‘fundamentally incompatible visions’ come into collision and there is no effective constraint 
(procedural or systemic) on what Fish has called ‘the freedom to win’.118  In such 
circumstances, those who lose suffer a ‘hard-edged exclusion’.119  Moreover, Fish has argued 
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he also talks of ‘reversal’.  The relationship between these two processes merits close attention.  
‘Change’ may have to do with struggles in which one side prevails at the expense of another.  
But ‘reversal’ indicates that those who have suffered defeat (in such a struggle) may (at least 
on some occasions) return successfully to the fray.   Thus while Schmitt places emphasis on 
obliterating defeat, Fish entertains the possibility that an agenda may go into abeyance (and 
await the efforts of advocates who will breathe life back into it).  Here, we find at work in 
Fish’s thinking the assumption that it may be possible to undo the effects of argument by 
argumentative means.  More particularly, the idea of ‘reversal’ brings Fish close to a procedural 
commitment that, on his account, features prominently in liberal political philosophy.  This is 
the idea that ‘each party will get its turn at bat’.121 
To the extent that this is the case, Fish’s thinking bears some similarities to that of Ronald 
Dworkin, a liberal upon whom he has heaped criticism.122  Dworkin identifies a commitment 
to argument on a ‘fraternal’ model as a feature of liberalism.123  Argument on this model 
establishes a space for disagreement within which all participants recognise one another as 
having an enduring entitlement to take up a place.  However, the disagreements that unfold in 
this space can be fraught.  Dworkin makes this plain when he describes legal disputes in this 
context as ‘wars’.124  The ‘wars’ he has in mind are concerned with concepts (eg, ‘justice’, 
‘liberty’, ‘equality’, and ‘democracy’) that are legally (and politically) significant.125  Dworkin 
says of these and other such concepts that they establish ‘abstract plateaus of agreement’.126  
By this he means that they are underdeteminate.  They bear meaning but are open to a range of 
interpretations, each of which presents us with a distinct ‘conception’ of the relevant concept.127  
Dworkin also describes those who ascribe meaning to these concepts as doing so on an 
‘engaged’ basis.128  By this he means that they are participants in a ‘discourse’ or ‘practice’ 
towards which they adopt a critical, reflective attitude (with the aim of making it ‘the best it 
can be’).129  He adds that such a practice has a ‘first-order’ character (since understandings as 
to what might make it the best it can be arise within it and acquire the status of authoritative 
criteria).130  Dworkin contrasts discourse on this ‘engaged’ model with an approach to which 
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he applies the label ‘Archimedeanism’.  By Archimedeanism he means a ‘second-order’ or 
‘meta’-discourse that stands outside of context and affords (according to its proponents) a 
‘platform’ from which it is possible to apprehend universal truth.131   
Dworkin rejects Archimedeanism and nails his colours to the mast of engaged discourse.132  By 
doing this, he embraces the idea that argument is (to take a phrase from Fish) ‘all we have’.133  
Dworkin’s decision to adopt this position also makes it possible for us to classify him as a 
proponent of the theory-ladenness of fact.  A prominent assumption at work in the politico-
legal context he describes supports this view.  This is the assumption that all those who 
participate in the argumentative ‘wars’ he describes must do so in ways that conform with the 
principle that all members of society merit equal concern and respect.134  Here we find an 
argumentative resource that promises (from the relevant first-order standpoint) to make the 
context in which it has force the best it can be.  Moreover, this is a feature of Dworkin’s 
approach to argument that throws light on his understanding of the relationship between law 
and politics.  Law places constraints on the range of ways in which the argumentative ‘wars’ 
that feature in his analysis can unfold.  The principle that all members of society merit equal 
concern and respect is one such constraint (or limitation on the freedom to win).  To the extent 
that Fish suggests something similar when he talks not just of ‘change’ but of ‘reversal’, his 
thinking diverges significantly from that of Schmitt.   
We can explore the understanding of the relationship between law and politics that finds clear 
expression in Dworkin and that seems to inform Fish’s thinking by drawing on Hart’s account 
of law as a system.  Hart’s exposition affords a basis on which to draw a sharp distinction 
between Fish and Dworkin.  Moreover, this contrast makes it possible to highlight ways in 
which Fish’s thinking diverges significantly from that of Schmitt.  But before we turn to these 
matters, we must examine what Hart has to say on law as a system.  His focus is on ‘mature’ 
municipal legal systems (and his aim in analysing them is to contribute to general jurisprudence 
by making universal truth-claims).135  The analysis he offers is spare.  He presents us with a 
hierarchy of norms.  In combination, these norms constitute a distinct (systemic) normative 
space.  This space radiates down and out from a highest-order norm, the rule of recognition 
(which provides the ultimate test of legal validity within any such system).  Within spaces of 
this sort we find, ‘primary’ rules that place people under obligations.  We also find ‘secondary’ 
rules that make it possible to change existing law and to resolve legal disputes.136  If such a 
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system is to endure, a sufficient number of those who participate in its operations (be they legal 
officials or others) must accept the rule of recognition’s highest-order status.  In this context, 
acceptance involves a readiness on the part of the law’s addressees to treat it as the ultimate 
source of authoritative reasons for action.  Those who make such a response adopt what Hart 
calls law’s ‘internal point of view’ (and take a not merely accepting but ‘critical’ and 
‘reflective’ attitude towards it).137  As well as presenting us with this picture of a legal system, 
Hart also recognises that the positions lawmakers stake out within it are politically significant. 
They may, for example, seek to accommodate goods that compete with one another (such as 
freedom of action and security) in particular ways.138  To these features of Hart’s account of 
law as a system, we should add one more.  He recognises that the beginnings of any such 
system have a raw political character.  These beginnings take the form of a claim to authority 
that elicits a positive response from enough people to establish a rule of recognition.  Here, 
Hart uses a phrase that would not look out of place in Schmitt’s writings.  For he declares that 
‘all that succeeds is success’.139    
Hart’s analysis prompts very different responses from Fish and Dworkin.  Fish focuses on 
Hart’s account of the core of certainty that legal rules exhibit.  He tells us that the core (as Hart 
describes it) establishes a ‘barrier’ or ‘gate’ that places limits on the exercise of discretion.140  
Fish is dismissive of the idea that rules work in this way and finds in Hart’s determination to 
‘cling to the core’ a ‘strategy of desperation’.141  He takes this view because the core (as we 
noted earlier) is the product of prior interpretive activity that has won assent in a particular 
interpretive community (thus establishing agreement in judgments).  As such it is a contingent 
feature of the legal scene that may be swept aside by later interpretive activity (on the part of 
those who seize ‘the opportunities afforded by power and occasion’).142  Here, Fish concludes 
that the point Hart makes on the rule of recognition’s origins (‘all that succeeds is success’) has 
general application to legal rules and other norms.143  As we noted earlier, the phrase ‘all that 
succeeds is success’ sounds a Schmittian note.  This is because the successes that Hart and Fish 
contemplate are, in fact, about more than success (a bare outcome).  They have to do with 
‘complex’ social facts that encompass will (on which Schmitt places emphasis) and the change 
it brings about by rhetorical means (to which Fish gives pride of place).144   
While Fish’s response to Hart concerns language and its limitations as a constraint on will (and 
rhetoric), Dworkin takes a quite different tack.  He focuses on the nature of the claims to 
authority and the felt sense of obligation that arise in legal systems of the sort Hart describes.  
According to Hart, claims to authority in these systems could be purely legal.  He took this 
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view because he was a proponent of the legal positivist separability thesis, according to which 
there is no necessary connection between law and morality.145  Dworkin rejects this thesis and 
seeks to demonstrate that law’s claims to authority and the sense of obligation it fosters are 
moral.146  As well as making this response to Hart, Dworkin also argues that the morality at 
work in modern municipal legal systems (such as that of the USA) is a driver of egalitarian 
reform.  More particularly, he argues that it requires lawmakers to fashion norms, and establish 
institutions and practices, that all those affected by the law’s operations have reason to 
endorse.147  Here, Dworkin takes his cues on morality from the moral and political philosopher 
Immanuel Kant.148  For Kant argued that morality places us under a duty to meet the 
requirements of a categorical imperative (by acting only on principles of action to which all 
people could rationally assent).149  As well as staking out a position on law’s normativity that 
calls Kant to mind, Dworkin forges a link between it and Hart’s account of law as a system.  
He accepts that legal systems place institutional constraints on the range of ways in which 
lawmakers can use the power at their disposal to advance the cause of morality.150  However, 
he contemplates the possibility of moral progress in the direction of a ‘purer form of law within 
and beyond the law we have’.151  On this view, lawmakers may be able to stake out a wide 
range of morally defensible positions within an existing legal system.  But if the system limits 
their capacity to work along these lines, then the attractions of ‘law beyond the law’ (a more 
adequate systemic space) will become apparent to them.152  Moreover, if they were to establish 
such a space, it would, on Dworkin’s analysis, count as a clear instance of moral progress (since 
it would be a step in the direction of ‘pure’ law).153 
Dworkin devotes closer attention than Fish to institutional constraints in legal systems of the 
sort that feature in Hart’s analysis.  However, Fish’s reflections on processes of 
‘transformation’ (in the law and elsewhere) intersect with Dworkin’s concerns.  For example, 
in an essay called ‘Transmuting the Lump’, he argues that a succession of incremental changes 
can bring about a fundamental alteration in the way we understand a normative space.  Where 
this happens a new ‘stabilising …centre’ ‘speaks [the] landscape and declares the shape of 
everything in it’.154  These points lead Fish to conclude that ‘human beings are able to construct 
the roadway on which they are travelling’ and that it may carry them in new directions.155  He 
adds that those who move along such a ‘roadway’ may regard their previous commitments as 
nothing more than a ‘way station’.156  However, he does not, when contemplating such 
developments, talk in terms of progress (other than in the sense of movement).  Rather, he 
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presents a picture of people who struggle perpetually to advance the agendas they favour in 
bounded argument spaces whose contours they may reshape through the successful exertion of 
rhetorical power.   
As an account not merely of argument but also of ‘the human condition’, this is bleak.  Those 
with power (here in a rhetorical form) prevail.  Moreover, they do so by seizing the 
‘opportunities afforded by … occasion’.157  In these ways, they determine the direction of 
practical life –and the upshot of their efforts is ‘episodic’ rather than ‘teleological’.158  These 
points make it possible to bring into focus another difference between Fish and Schmitt.  While 
Fish fastens his attention on ‘context-specific’ argument and its effects, his analysis has the 
appearance of an exercise in what we might call anthropological Archimedeanism.  This is 
because it appears to proceed from a platform that stands outside of context and that makes it 
possible to see argument for what it is: a power struggle that we can expect to unfold endlessly 
and in ways that do not hold out the promise of progress.  Schmitt’s account of friend-versus-
foe politics carries us over much the same terrain.  But unlike Fish, he (as we noted earlier) 
relishes the conflict he contemplates.  Moreover, during the period in which he gave his support 
to the Nazis, he seems to have found a teleology of ‘progress’ (on a racial supremacist and 
Social Darwinist model) at work within friend-versus-foe politics.159  In Fish, by contrast, we 
find no hint of teleology.  His aim is simply to present an accurate account of how things stand 
among those who engage in and live with argument’s ‘episodic’ effects. 
Fish goes about his business in this way with great discipline.  As an anthropological 
Archimedean, his concern is with ‘non-local truth’ (as it manifests itself in context-specific 
ways).160  Discipline is also plain to see in his determination not to pursue an agenda, 
programme, or goal (eg, a model of human association) of the sort we have associated with 
politics.161   These features of Winning Arguments and his other works lend them a politically 
inert appearance.  However, there is a tendency towards equivocation in his writings that 
suggests that a distinct politics may be at work within them.  This tendency towards 
equivocation becomes apparent when we juxtapose his account of a ‘final conflict’ with what 
he has to say on ‘reversal’ (following ‘change’).  ‘Reversal’ (for the reasons we explored 
earlier) sounds an inclusionary, egalitarian note, while talk of a ‘final conflict’ has a Schmittian 
ring.  There is certainly a tension between the idea of a ‘reversal’ and that of a ‘final conflict’.  
We might seek to mute this tension.  To this end, we could argue that ‘reversal’ relates to 
‘change’ within a space whose contours remain stable (eg, the US Supreme Court’s decision 
in Obergefell).  By contrast, we could say of a ‘final conflict’ that sees the defenders of the 
status quo go down to obliterating defeat against their opponents, that it results in (systemic) 
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‘transformation’.162  But to make these points, is to draw a sharp distinction that Fish’s 
emphasis on the malleability of ‘argument spaces’ does not encourage.  In light of these points, 
it seems warranted to talk of a tendency towards equivocation.  For the source of tension on 
which we have focused leaves us wondering if the ‘conflict’ to which Fish refers really would 
be ‘final’.  Likewise, it prompts the thought that he may be more of a liberal than he recognises.  
To find that liberalism has perhaps exerted influence on one who has spent decades in the 
academy would be far from surprising.  Moreover, if liberalism does tinge his thinking, it is 
important not to make too much of this point.  It may simply reflect the fact that ‘we knowers 
are’, on occasion, ‘unknown to ourselves’.163  Matters are, certainly, very different when we 
turn to Schmitt.  While he had extensive exposure to liberal academe, its decencies and 
decorums did not foster anything resembling an inclusionary, egalitarian sensibility in him.  In 
his writings, there is no equivocation on the point that, when friends and foes come into 
conflict, the outcome (for those on the losing side) could be fatal.164  
Fish certainly has no enthusiasm for this ghastly prospect.  But, as we have noted, he sets his 
face against progress on the model we found earlier in Dworkin.  Consequently, he adopts a 
position quite unlike those contributions to the liberal tradition that seek to point the way 
towards an end-state in which people secure their interests on an enduring basis.  Dworkin 
presents us with the outlines of such an end-state when he proposes ways in which to bring 
‘justice’, ‘equality’, ‘liberty’, and ‘democracy’ into a harmonious and lasting relationship.  On 
his account, this will involve (among other things) establishing conditions that make ‘majority 
rule’ ‘fair’.165  These conditions include a constitutional system of individual rights against the 
majority that judges uphold by means of judicial review.166  Here, we find Dworkin 
contemplating a politico-legal oasis or safe space in which politicians, lawyers, and ‘ordinary 
people’ argue about the significance of the values and ideals they share while remaining free 
from threats to their security.167  Thus they conduct politico-legal ‘wars’.  But, happily, these 
are wars in which there are no enemies of the sort who might descend to ‘large P politics’.168  
As we have noted, Fish takes the view that we cannot hope to establish and maintain a 
framework of the sort Dworkin contemplates (due to the limitations of legal language and the 
aggressive propensities of people).  However, it may be possible to establish a normatively 
appealing, highly resilient, but not entirely safe space.  Such a context may also throw light on 
a form of liberalism more modest than that on offer in Dworkin’s works and those of other 
liberals with equally large ambitions (eg, Habermas).  This chastened form of liberalism may 
also be able to withstand at least some of the criticisms that Fish levels at more ambitious 
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contributions to the liberal tradition.  Moreover, there are reasons for thinking that liberalism 
in this modest form may be able to draw strength from Fish’s account of interpretive 
communities.  In the section below, we will explore these possibilities by reference to British 
law.169      
A CHASTENED LIBERALISM IN A NOT ENTIRELY SAFE SPACE 
Britain’s constitutional order presents us with a context to which Hart’s account of modern 
municipal legal systems has ready applicability.  This is because we find a normative space 
that radiates out and down from its highest-order norm, the rule of recognition (Parliamentary 
sovereignty).  Within this space, lawmakers have been able to stake out a wide variety of 
political positions that have attracted the labels ‘liberal’, ‘conservative’, and ‘socialist’.170  
Likewise, judges have fashioned norms at common law that accommodate politically 
significant values that stand in tension-filled relations with one another (eg, security and 
freedom of action).171  Insofar as positions such as these sit within this space, we can describe 
it as ‘politico-legal’ rather than simply ‘legal’.  This description seems apt when we consider 
the conflictual character of the political process that often unfolds in this context.  It is a context 
in which a Conservative politician may find intimations of ‘Gestapo’-like authoritarianism in 
socialism and in which his socialist opponent may describe Conservatives as ‘lower than 
vermin’.172  Here we find politics on a model that can, and on occasion does, tend in a 
Schmittian direction.  But at the same time, it is a context in which commitment to an 
egalitarian philosophy of government has found increasingly strong expression.  It is apparent 
in extensions in the franchise (from 1832) that issued (in the twentieth century) in universal 
suffrage and in a body of anti-discrimination and human rights law that has grown apace in the 
last half-century.    
When we view this context from the standpoint of liberal political philosophy (on the ambitious 
model exemplified by Dworkin) it is less than ideal.  This is because the sovereign legislature 
could sweep away the egalitarian commitments that have been accumulating in it along a 
lengthy timeline.  More fundamentally from a systemic standpoint, a sustained argumentative 
assault on the rule of recognition could undercut its highest-order status.  The culmination of 
such an assault might be a ‘final conflict’ in which this system passes out of existence.  Such a 
development could carry those who live with its effects in a range of directions.  Some of these 
directions may be progressive (eg, an intensification of existing egalitarian commitments), 
while others may be retrograde (eg, practical arrangements that entrench social disadvantage).  
For this reason, those who live within this framework are not entirely safe from the successful 
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advance of retrograde politics.  But this, on Fish’s analysis, is an inescapable state of affairs.  
For human beings, as we noted earlier, have it in their power ‘to construct the roadway on 
which they are travelling’ – and, in this way, ‘open[ ] the present towards a contingent 
future’.173    
While it is clearly possible to construct a roadway out of the system we are considering, this 
has not happened.174  This may reflect the fact that it has operated in ways that have, along a 
lengthy timeline, elicited consistently (if not invariably) positive responses from those who live 
within it.  This is a point to which political anthropology on the less optimistic model we 
considered earlier lends some support.  Consider Hobbes (whose thinking, as we have noted, 
has affinities with that of Fish and Schmitt).  He pursues the theme that people have reason to 
co-operate with sovereign power for as long as it secures their interest in the fundamental good 
of peace.175  However, he also sees in humankind a standing threat to politico-legal institutions.  
For people have at work within them impulses that make them assertive and disputations.  This 
means that they may be ready to unpick the practical arrangements that go some way towards 
securing their interests.  This feature of their make-up led Hobbes to stake out a position on 
language (in the law and more generally) that amounts to an exercise in ‘verbal engineering’.176  
Moreover, it is a position that brings him (for reasons we will explore below) into conflict with 
Fish.  Hobbes argues that those who cooperate with the sovereign should accept that it has the 
power to stipulate the meaning of all words in the public language.177  A sovereign who pins 
meaning down in this way would, according to Hobbes, forestall the danger that arises when 
people become ‘entangled in words’ as a result of arguing over the meanings they should 
bear.178  This is the danger that such entanglement will excite the assertive, disputatious 
impulses that sovereign power exists to quell.  
While Hobbes urges us to avoid ‘entanglement in words’ (by giving the sovereign the power 
to stipulate meanings), we can extract from Fish (who labels him an ‘arch formalist’) support 
for a contrary conclusion.179  Moreover, it is a conclusion that may throw light on the powers 
of endurance exhibited by the legal system we are considering.  In order to explain why this is 
the case, we must return to Fish’s account of interpretive communities.  As we noted earlier, 
he identifies these communities as the source of the meaning that finds expression in the 
language their members use.  He also recognises that this language, while being a common 
‘point of reference’, is open to a range plausible interpretations.180  While he does not use the 
term, he thus provides support for the conclusion that the language that features in the 
communities he describes is underdeterminate.  When people explore the range of ways in 
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which it is possible to use such language, they become entangled in words.  Just such 
entanglement is a feature of politico-legal life in the normative space we are considering.  
Terms like ‘natural justice’ in public law and ‘consideration’ in private law bear readily 
intelligible meaning and, at the same time, invite exploration.  So too do ‘equality’, liberty’, 
‘justice’, and ‘democracy’ (within legal and political institutions and more generally).  As the 
process of exploration unfolds, the terms under scrutiny become sites of conflict (as members 
of particular interpretive communities vie with one another to pin down meaning in plausible 
ways).  But at the same time, these and other such terms become placeholders for a limited, but 
revisable, range of concerns that tell a story of community-wide consensus.  Consider ‘natural 
justice’.  It prompts those who reflect on it to consider the requirements of procedural justice 
and the social effects (positive and negative) of adhering to this ideal.181   
There are reasons for thinking that Fish underestimates the significance of language that works 
in this way.  This is a point we can bring into sharp focus by thinking of such language as a 
form of social capital.  ‘Social capital’ encompasses all those practical attitudes, dispositions, 
practices, and institutions that foster and sustain co-operation between people.182  Terms such 
as ‘natural justice’ have a distinct (if malleable) shape that is a function of cooperation 
(collective intentionality) in the interpretive community whose members use them.  Hart lends 
support to this point when he describes language as having a meaning-bearing ‘core’.  
However, he makes only a glancing reference to the social capital that core meanings embody 
and that grows up around them (in, for example, institutional form).  He does this when he 
forges a link between the core of particular terms and what he (following Wittgenstein) calls 
agreement in judgments on their use.  This is a point that yields support for the conclusion that 
Fish has missed something important when he describes Hart’s invocation of the core as ‘a 
strategy of desperation’.  Moreover, what he has missed is not just the practical significance of 
Hart’s exposition but of his own response to it.  Fish’s account of the concerns that unite 
interpretive communities, and the (underdeterminate) language in which they find expression, 
relates to the same fund of social capital that flickers into view in The Concept of Law.  There 
are, to be sure, significant differences between Hart’s exposition and Fish’s response to it.  Hart 
is alive to consensus (in the form of agreement in judgments).  Fish places emphasis on conflict 
(the ways in which the members of an interpretive community use the linguistic resources they 
share to advance competing agendas).183  However, when we combine their respective 
analyses, we can see how the language we have been considering is, at once, the fruit of 
cooperation and a site of and means to stabilise (or manage) conflict. 
As well as throwing light on the powers of endurance exhibited by the legal system we are 
considering, this analysis also brings into sharp focus a distinction between Fish and Schmitt.  
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As we noted earlier, Schmitt argues that legal language is an empty vessel and that the will of 
an individual or a group yields the content it lacks.  While will is at work in the interpretive 
communities Fish describes, they are also contexts in which reflection on meaning is strongly 
present.  An interpretive community may breathe life into a particular term.  But as it establishes 
this intersubjective reference point, it creates opportunities for its members to explore (change, 
reverse, transform) the range of meanings any such linguistic token may bear.  This is a point 
we can press further by drawing on a recent meditation on language offered by the philosopher, 
Charles Taylor.  Taylor argues that language draws us into a ‘semantic’ realm where we engage 
in processes of reflection that involve a ‘gathering of attention’.184  On Taylor’s account, 
reflection makes it possible for people to hold particular matters in contemplation by dwelling 
on the significance of words that may or may not have relevance to them.185  On this topic, he 
states that we often find ourselves in a ‘zone’ where our existing descriptions ‘give out’.186  
However, he adds that any such zone is ‘situated in a context of words’.187  Consequently, we 
have at our disposal linguistic resources (spurs to reflection) that enable us to isolate objects 
within the ‘stream of sensations’ we experience.188  These resources also make it possible for 
us to pick out features of the objects we contemplate that invest them with a distinct identity.189  
Here, it is crucial to recognise that Taylor is not talking about the apprehension of an abiding 
essence from an Archimedean platform that stands outside of context.  He makes this clear 
when he argues that words (as components in a natural language) are the bearers of and draw 
those who use them into particular cultures that yield distinct forms of lived experience.190  This 
is because words spur reflection in ways that give expression to a sense of ‘aboutness’ or 
‘intentionality’ vis-à-vis the objects we apprehend that Fish would describe as ‘context-
specific’.191  Taylor also argues that context-specific reflection on the model he describes 
develops in people a ‘refined sense of human meanings’ that embraces moral and other 
values.192  Consequently, language propels people into normatively charged contexts (each of 
which yields a distinct ‘mode of psychic life’ or type of lived experience).193  Moreover, Taylor 
applies this analysis to distinct ‘language practices’ within wider cultural contexts (or forms of 
life) that encompass them.194  
The relevance of Taylor’s analysis to the context we are considering is immediately apparent 
when we consider what Hart has to say about judicial decision-making and legal language.  
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Hart’s interest in ‘the core’ of legal language has to do with the pursuit of justice.  He makes 
this clear when he identifies the core as yielding a basis for making analogical leaps into the 
penumbra when novel cases arise.195  He notes that judges may be able to justify such leaps by 
reference to ‘the central precept of justice’ that we should ‘[t]reat like cases alike and different 
cases differently’.196  More particularly, he gestures in the direction of two ideals of justice 
(corrective and distributive) that foster a context-specific sense of relevance.197  While Hart 
offers this analysis with the aim of making a contribution to general jurisprudence, it 
instantiates a process of reflection on the practice- and culture-specific model Taylor describes.  
For the language on which Hart dwells serves justice-related ends that feature prominently in 
the modern municipal context we are considering (and others that are broadly similar to it).198  
Moreover, when a judge makes an analogical leap of the sort Hart contemplates, he or she is 
elaborating something that is ‘already there’.199  It takes the form of a practice that has ramified 
along a lengthy timeline and that constitutes a rich fund of social capital (in the form of an 
action-guiding ‘context of words’).200     
In response to these points, Fish might talk of an ‘agenda’ that (through acts of will on the part 
of those who embrace it) inscribes itself on a new object.  Such a response would underestimate 
language’s power to draw people into webs of meaning (argument spaces) that can stabilise 
their behaviour more or less effectively because they are more of less normatively appealing.  
It would also undersell the richness of Fish’s contribution (which throws light on interpretive 
communities as contexts in which underdeterminate language makes possible the accumulation 
of social capital).  To place emphasis on an ‘agenda’ and the will that drives it forward is to 
offer a comparatively thin analysis that has obvious affinities with Schmitt’s decisionism 
(understood as ‘perfect “wilfulness”’).201  The thinness this analysis becomes apparent when 
we recognise that it reduces the character of the normative impulses at work in the politico-
legal system we have been examining to just another will-driven agenda.  This is a point we 
can press further by reference to the optimistic political anthropology that Schmitt identifies as 
informing liberal political philosophy.  As we noted earlier, those liberals who think along the 
lines Schmitt describes repose confidence in legal language as a constraint.  Taylor and Fish 
lend support to the view that are they right to do so.  For legal language (in common with 
language generally) prompts us to reflect on its practical significance.  If the resulting process 
of reflection leads us to conclude that legal rules and other norms serve our interests, we have 
a powerful incentive to treat them as authoritative.  These points throw light on what we might 
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(at the very least) understand to be the prudential normative force of legal and political 
institutions in which liberal practical impulses find expression.  However, this suggestion 
invites the response that all language is (on Taylor’s analysis) a spur to reflection and such 
activity may be intense when it concerns matters in which people understand themselves to 
have an interest.  This may be true.  But if liberalism encourages the view that it is concerned 
with maintaining an environment in which all people have an interest (because it delivers 
security), it may possess uncommon normative appeal and powers of endurance. 
When Fish describes liberal political philosophy as just another agenda, he deflects attention 
from this possibility.  Dworkin brings us closer to it when he offers an account of intense 
disputes (‘legal wars’) that concern goods in which all people have an interest.  His application 
of the term ‘war’ to these disputes is an indicator of the investment people (legal officials and 
other addressees of the law) make in them.202  This analysis may also throw light on the 
agonised process of reflection that Hart went through while formulating a response to 
Dworkin’s critique of his legal positivist statement of position in The Concept of Law.  While 
Hart ultimately remained committed to the separability thesis, he gave serious consideration to 
abandoning it and embracing the idea that law and morality are necessarily related.203  It may 
be that the temptation he felt, but resisted, to conclude that law’s normativity is moral reflected 
the normative force exerted by the mature municipal legal systems that bulk large in his 
exposition.  If this suggestion is correct, we can find in Hart lived experience that attests to a 
possibility that Fish is ill-equipped to bring into focus as a result of his use of the reductive 
(will-driven), homogenising term ‘agenda’. 
These are points that throw light on the relationship between law and politics in the context we 
have been considering.  ‘Law’ and ‘politics’ prompt (on the analysis we have taken from 
Taylor) context-specific reflection on two complex and interrelated practices.  ‘Politics’ is not 
simply about power (the ability to assert one’s will in the face of resistance from others).  
Rather, it has to do with interest accommodation on an egalitarian model.  This understanding 
of politics is, at once, substantive (egalitarian) and procedural (we must take account of all 
relevant, interests, claims and more general concerns).  This gives law its entrée.  For law 
establishes procedures that underwrite this understanding.  This point also yields a basis on 
which to explain how law’s normativity could take on a moral appearance.  This is because the 
understanding of politics to which it gives expression has to do with securing the interests of 
all relevant people.  Here we seem to have fastened on a cluster of considerations that throw 
light on how to establish a normatively appealing (because egalitarian) but not entirely safe 
(because contingent) space.  It is a space that gives us means to accommodate the assertive, 
disputatious people who feature in the less optimistic contributions to political anthropology 
that Fish, Hart, and Hobbes offer.  To this end, it makes extensive use of language (understood 
as an underdeterminate placeholder) that entangles people in words.  It may be that a context 
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such as this gives us our best shot at a resilient but not entirely safe space.  It certainly presents 
us with a chastened form of liberalism - alive to the imperfections of language and people.  
CONCLUSIONS 
In this response to Winning Arguments and Fish’s other works, we have pointed up similarities 
between his critique of liberal jurisprudence and political philosophy and that of Carl Schmitt.  
Like Schmitt, Fish places emphasis on the deficiencies of legal language as a constraint on 
law’s operations.  We also find in his writings an emphasis on interpretive communities that 
bears some similarities to Schmitt’s institutional turn (which features an invocation of 
collective will as a guide to judicial action).  Fish again stakes out a position that has affinities 
with Schmitt when he dwells on ‘the human condition’.  Here, he presents an account of people 
as restless and assertive that has much in common with Schmitt’s critique of the 
‘anthropological optimism’ on display in liberal political philosophy.  Fish’s reflections on the 
human condition lead him to conclude that liberals who seek to establish a context that is free 
from disagreement hunger for a world that is unavailable to them.  Schmitt offers a gruesome 
variation on the same theme in his account of friend-versus-foe politics.  For he presents us 
with a world in which potentially lethal struggle between groups is a permanent feature of the 
practical scene.   
Alongside these points, we must set others that bring into view significant differences between 
Fish and Schmitt.  Fish seeks to offer what we might call a diagnosis of the human condition.  
Schmitt, by contrast, is a proponent of friend-versus-foe politics.  On this matter, as on his more 
general critique of liberalism, Schmitt is unequivocal.  There are, however, some signs of 
equivocation in Fish.  When he talks of a ‘final conflict’ between those whose arguments bring 
them into collision, he sounds a Schmittian note.  This is not, however, true, of his reflections 
on processes of ‘change’ and ‘reversal’.  ‘Change’ may carry us in the direction of a final 
conflict.  But ‘reversal’ pulls us back from cataclysms of the sort that change may threaten or 
bring about.  Moreover, ‘change’ and ‘reversal’ in combination seem to move us in the 
direction of inclusionary, egalitarian practical arrangements.  This is because Fish holds out 
the prospect of an agenda going into abeyance while retaining some prospect of securing (at a 
later date) a position of social primacy.  These points suggest that Fish’s thinking may bear the 
traces of the liberalism against which he sets his face.  But to the extent that there are 
intimations of liberalism at work in his thinking, it is very different from that on display in 
Ronald Dworkin.  For it does not hold out the prospect of movement towards a just and 
enduring end-state or safe space.  
The possibility that liberal assumptions may inflect Fish’s thinking is not one that his emphasis 
on agendas encourages us to entertain.  Rather, it suggests that he (like Schmitt) is a thinker 
who takes a bleak view of the human condition and is thus a dealer in what Michael Oakeshott 
called ‘darkness’.204  For he prompts us to consider not just argument but social life more 
generally as an incessant struggle at the base of which lies will.  He also recognises that will, 
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as a force that expresses itself through argument, may lead us in the direction of ‘large P 
politics’ and the hard-edged exclusions it can bring in train.  However, Fish’s account of 
interpretive communities and the linguistic placeholders in which their concerns find 
expression lends plausibility to an alternative analysis of Winning Arguments and his other 
works.  This analysis identifies interpretive communities and the linguistic resources they bring 
into existence as forms of social capital.  Moreover, it draws strength from Charles Taylor’s 
account of language as a spur to reflection on the impulses at work in particular cultures.  Taylor 
tells us that reflection along the lines he describes will lead those who engage in it in particular 
directions.  In response to this analysis, Fish might talk in terms of an array of agendas (each 
of which opens up practical possibilities that we can explain by reference to the theory-
ladenness of fact).  But to make such a response would be to flatten out important distinctions 
between particular directions of travel (and the types of lived experience they make possible).  
Some may be more attuned than others to considerations that make a social environment secure 
for all those who live within it.  Where this is the case, the reasons for action these 
considerations yield may exert uncommon persuasive force on those who contemplate theme.  
Moreover, they may find in these reasons the stuff of what they consider to be truth.  But, if 
they do, it is not truth independent of argument.  For the reasons to which they are responsive 
and the interests to which they relate them are building blocks in arguments that have a context-
specific or ‘first-order’ (and not Archimedean) character.  This is a possibility to which our 
examination of British law has relevance.  We found in this context understandings of ‘law’ 
and ‘politics’ that are the bearers of an egalitarian culture in which a commitment to security 
for all has a place.  Moreover, these understandings seem to have shaped a politico-legal 
environment whose powers of endurance have to do with the persuasive force of the 
normativity at work within it.  If those who inhabit such a space continue to make engaged 
responses to the demands it places on them, it can endure.  But co-operative responses may not 
be forthcoming from the assertive, disputatious people who populate Winning Arguments and 
Fish’s other writings.  If we make the large anthropological assumption that these are the people 
who inhabit our legal and political institutions, we would be wrong to think we can take up 
residence in a politico-legal safe space. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
             
